09 December 2005

UK ID scheme: blessing or backlash for biometrics?

SA Mathieson

The British House of Commons voted on 13 February by a majority of 31 to compel anyone applying for a passport also to accept an identity card and enrol on the national identity register. This is a database which will store the facial, fingerprint and iris biometrics of its subjects, along with much other information.

Although the House of Lords, which previously voted to break the government’s linking of passports and identity cards in what is known as the scheme’s voluntary phase, may again try to cut this link, the Commons will almost certainly get its way. The result will be that, from 2008, Britons will be faced with either accepting an identity card or forgoing their passports when they become due for renewal.

Labour politicians have hailed the biometrics on which the scheme depends as a great technological leap forward. “By 2010, according to the forecasts of Bill Gates, people will, through biometrics, access their phone, email, computer, and bank – through a fingerprint touch of a screen anywhere in the world,” said Gordon Brown, the chancellor and assumed future prime minister, in a speech given on the day of the Commons vote.

In talking about the creation of a commissioner to oversee the identity database, he added: “It may be right also to consider for the future whether the Commissioner should report to Parliament, taking an overarching look across both the public and private uses of biometrics, so ensuring the proper safeguards.”

Impact on biometrics

Greater regulation for other uses of biometrics is therefore one possible impact of the government’s scheme. Are there others?

It is possible that familiarity with biometrics as a result of state identity checks will make the public comfortable with the technology. Bernard Herdan, the chief executive of the UK Passport Service (which will be expanded to manage the identity card and database), was asked at the Biometrics 2005 show last October about the criminal connotations of taking fingerprints. “Most of the public in the trials [for the UK identity scheme] didn’t react badly to it,” he said. “Also, helpfully, those travelling to the States are getting used to fingerprints at border posts.” (More at http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/051021_UK_passports.htm).

However, the reverse is also possible. Two polls by ICM of around 1,000 Britons suggest familiarity with the government’s scheme is breeding contempt: the first in December 2004 for Reform, which quoted a price of £85, found that 19% thought it was a very good idea and 49% a good idea, making 68% in favour, while the second in November 2005 for No2ID quoted a £93 price found 14% seeing it as a very good idea and 36% a a good idea, totalling 50%. A representative of ICM said the two results were directly comparable, and that respondents are not told who is sponsoring research.

"If people start to associate producing biometrics with unpleasant encounters with officials, then there is a sense in which biometrics themselves will be tarred with this brush of social surveillance and official interference,” says Guy Herbert, general secretary of the campaign group No2ID.

This tarring could be caused or exacerbated if the government’s scheme proves unreliable, even if this is not due to the reliability of biometric technologies. The scheme’s structure has been criticised by security experts, including Brian Gladman, a security consultant to US government agencies, who wrote sections of a critical report from the London School of Economics.

Before the vote, he wrote to the prime minister telling him that the central database will “create safety and security risks for all those whose details are entered on the system”, adding that although he is in favour of a voluntary identity card scheme, he will risk fines by refusing to apply for the UK scheme if and when it is made compulsory.

Easy does it

Peter Hanel, European institutions director for Motorola's Biometric Identity Management and Security Solutions unit, previously worked for the European Commission on biometric systems such as Eurodac, a system through which European countries can compare fingerprints. He says that public acceptance of biometrics depends on gradual introduction, clear benefits to citizens and clear policies on use. “As soon as citizens realise there are benefits, they have advantages, and if they are sure they are not used for other purposes, they can trust,” he says, adding that acceptance is increasing as a result of adoption by foreign governments and computer hardware manufacturers, such as fingerprint scanners on laptop computers.

But he says that the failure of a government’s biometric system would have a knock-on effect on vendors of the technology, although he thinks this is more likely outside Europe and other rich countries, where security controls are weaker. "It would damage the reputation of companies, even if they were not involved, as they would have to prove it could not happen,” he says.

A specific danger to British use of biometrics could arise if the biometric information on the UK national identity register was compromised. If biometric records were stored as templates, they would only be useful for confirming the subject’s identity, which would rarely be of use to criminals. However, if the original records – such as high-resolution images of fingerprints – were also retained and then stolen, these could potentially be used in attempts to steal a subject’s identity.

Links

Report of Brian Gladman’s letter: http://www.guardian.co.uk/idcards/story/0,,1708461,00.html

ICM identity card polls: December 2004: http://www.icmresearch.co.uk/reviews/2004/Reform%20-%20ID%20cards/reform-id-cards-dec-04.asp

© SA Mathieson 2006.

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