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Being
a good security citizen
Bruce Potter, founder and Shmoo Group
It's been said that the internet is a global community
made of all the users on the network. Like any community, there
are businesses conducting commerce, individuals going about their
daily lives, and even a few bad actors. But unlike our physical
communities, there are no police cars roaming the neighbourhoods
looking for these bad actors. There aren’t even boundaries
that help law enforcement activities. At the end of the day, this
global community without boundaries means that every enterprise
has to be on the lookout for not just the security of their own
systems, but also the security of the community as a whole.
This is obviously a difficult situation. It's hard enough to secure
your own systems; being on the lookout for the entire internet is
an impossible situation. Further, it is outside the commonly accepted
mission of most IT security departments to be accountable for security
beyond the network boundaries. So, how do you balance the need to
be a good security citizen with the need to minimise operational
costs and maximise the assurance of your systems?
Passive mechanisms
Being a good security citizen starts with your local configurations
and operational procedures. If your networks and systems are vulnerable,
they can become Petri dishes for attackers. Much like a pool without
a fence, an insecure network is an attractive nuisance that will
draw in attackers. These attackers will then use your systems to
attack other networks. Botnets and zombies are a huge problem on
the net, and the propagation of these types of malicious code is
often due to known vulnerabilities and system weaknesses.
Applying patches, using strong passwords, and employing other industry
best practices is the best thing you can do to be a good internet
security citizen. Thankfully, these actions are the same actions
we take every day to protect our assets and our employees. So the
first step in being a good citizen is one most of us have taken
already.
Even with industry best practices in place, the potential for security
incidents still exists within your network. Also, if you are a product
vendor, security researchers may find vulnerabilities in your products
that they wish to disclose to you. To facilitate security communication
with the outside world, you should create predictable and reliable
contact mechanisms.
The Organization for Internet Safety (OIS) recommends some simple
solutions for communications. Foremost among them is the creation
of a security page on your corporation's primary webserver (for
instance, http://www.yourcompany.com/security/) that provides appropriate
information for those looking to contact you.
Also, an alias of security@yourcompany.com should be set up and
monitored for email communication in absence of web access. There
is more information available on the OIS website at www.oisafety.org.
Controlling rogue code within your enterprise is a critical aspect
of being a good security citizen. Many worms and bots use spoofed
IP addresses to obscure the location of the infection and decrease
the likelihood of detection. Spoofed addresses can only be successfully
stopped in the location of origin for the traffic.
An enterprise knows the source addresses that should exist in outbound
traffic. For instance, if your network is 192.168.0.0/24, your border
router should only see outbound traffic with source addresses from
that netblock. If a different source address is detected, then some
entity is spoofing source addresses. Blocking spoofed source addresses
at the outbound border is called egress filtering. Egress filtering,
if done on a large scale across the internet, can have a profound
effect on the detection and deletion of bots and worms.
Active mechanisms
The passive mechanisms described above recommend the generally
accepted minimum required to be considered a good security citizen.
There are many other actions you can take if your budget and/or
morals allow.
If your network detects an active or attempted intrusion, you may
chose to do more than just prevent the attack from being successful.
Many times, attacks originate from other systems that have been
compromised. By investigating the attack, you may find that another
enterprise is a victim too.
You may choose to notify system administrators of the other network
in an effort to assist them in stopping an active infection. Note,
however, that the act of notifying and conveying the needed information
takes time and depending on the level of sophistication of the victim
enterprise, you may be simply wasting your efforts.
You may also choose to track down the original attacker in an effort
stop the attack once and for all, and potentially to notify law
enforcement. This action is likely even more time intensive than
reaching out to other enterprises. Tracking down attackers and getting
them to stop is a technically and politically difficult problem.
Attackers have the upper hand in protecting their identity and hiding
their true location. Even if you are successful in finding the attacker,
if they are in a foreign country you may have no real recourse to
law enforcement.
Participating in a honeynet initiative is potentially a great way
to give back to the community without the cost of tracking down
attackers directly. Honeynets are systems where fake hosts are set
up to lure in attackers and deceive them into believing they have
compromised legitimate systems. These systems then report back to
a central authority on the actions and tools used by the attackers.
In turn, the central authority can analyse input from many sensors
in order to determine new attack techniques, changes in attack patterns,
and overall threats to the internet. Honeynets can be a sophisticated
mechanism for learning about attackers and providing intelligence
to the broader security community. However, honeynets are also a
distraction from the day to day operations of your enterprise and
may represent a security risk as attackers are essentially invited
into your network to perform malicious activities.
Parting shots
The internet is still young, and from a security perspective it
is still a bit like the wild west. Individual actors can cause great
harm to networks and systems half a world away. The security of
the internet is not the responsibility of a single organisation.
Rather, security is the responsibility of every operator plugged
into the network.
There is no single set of actions that make a good security citizen.
Rather, it is the intent of your actions and your ability to balance
your needs versus the needs of the broader network community that
ensure that you are positively contributing to the security of those
around you.
About the author
Bruce Potter is the founder of The Shmoo Group of security, crypto,
and privacy professionals. He helps organise ShmooCon, a yearly
information security conference in Washington DC that draws over
1000 attendees. Bruce has a background embedded system security,
software assurance, and enterprise IT operations. He is a senior
associate at Booz Allen Hamilton.
Network Security
Volume 2007, Issue 5, May 2007
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